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CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS:  THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT AND EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 




CITE AS: DEVIN MCCOMB, Civil Rights of Prisoners:  The Seventh Circuit and 
Exhaustion of Remedies Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 1 SEVENTH 




Recently, the images of Iraqi citizens imprisoned and tortured at 
Abu Ghraib enflamed the hearts and minds of many Americans who 
believed that our shared values forbid such treatment.1  But within our 
own borders, we have turned a blind eye to the often severe and 
inhumane conditions and treatment of American citizens incarcerated 
in federal and state prisons.2  One criminal judge in the Circuit Court 
of Cook County recently described a life spent in prison as "a kind of 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 See Larry Seaquist, Op-Ed., U.S. Military's Bad-Guy Dragnet — A Terrible 
Way to Win a War, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,  May 5, 2004, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0505/p09s02-coop.html.  See also David Dishneau, 
Abu Ghraib Dog Handler Sentenced to Six Months for Tormenting Prisoners, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, March 23, 2006, available at: 
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-abu23.html. 
2 Aside from the examples provided by the cases discussed below see Mathie v. 
Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 810-11 (2nd Cir. 1997) (inmate's had to be amputated due to 
medical neglect) and Williams v. U.S., 747 F. Supp. 967, 971-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(male inmate sexually assaulted by male prison guard).   
1
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slow, torturous death."3  Though Congress created a statute to allow 
citizens to sue individuals acting under color of state law for violating 
their constitutional rights, this protection is not equally available to all 
citizens.4  In fact, a large and steadily increasing group of individuals 
in American society, arguably those who have had their rights most 
severely curtailed, is not allowed to utilize the broad power of section 
1983 as freely as other citizens.5 
This unequal treatment was fostered through the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), a federal statute enacted in response to 
the large number of prisoner lawsuits alleging civil rights violations.6  
The PLRA, in contrast to previous congressional action, requires that 
inmates exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing suit 
alleging a civil rights violation under any federal statute.7  By placing 
an additional hurdle in front of prisoners who claim violations of their 
civil rights, Congress has shifted the balance away from protection of 
constitutional rights in favor of judicial economy.8  This additional 
                                                 
3 Stefano Esposito, Killer Gets Life Despite Wishes of Girl's Mom, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, April 11, 2006 (quoting Judge Stanley Sacks) available at 
http://www.chicagosuntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-durr11.html. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  This section reads:  “Every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.  ”See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing 
what Section 1983 is and how it provides civil rights protection against state 
officials). 
5See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (holding that prison inmates 
must exhaust all available administrative remedies before instituting a Section 1983 
suit). 
6 141 CONG. REC. S726 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (Statement of Sen. Dole) 
(describing the detrimental effects of frivolous litigation on justice and court 
systems). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1996). 
8 David M. Adlerstein, In Need of Correction:  The "Iron Triangle" of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1683 (2001). 
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requirement has immediately and drastically affected the fundamental 
rights of prisoners by preventing them from seeking judicial remedies 
for many possibly valid claims.9  Further, this exhaustion requirement 
must be viewed in the context of the modern penal system, the 
complex and often labyrinthine regulations that govern prison life, the 
broad range of rights that are affected and the harsh conditions in 
which these prisoners live out their lives. 
This Article examines the history of prisoner civil rights litigation, 
focusing on different congressional attempts to alleviate the burden on 
crowded federal dockets, while preserving the rights of prisoners.  
This is done by first addressing the predecessor of the PLRA, the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA")10, and then 
discussing the purposes and consequences of the PLRA.  This is 
followed by a discussion of several recent cases in which the Seventh 
Circuit has considered the scope of the PLRA's exhaustion 
requirement in prisoner civil rights actions.  These cases reveal two 
trends in recent Seventh Circuit jurisprudence illustrating how the 
court has tried to strike a balance between the legitimate goals of the 
PLRA and the constitutional rights of prisoners.  First, the Seventh 
Circuit will carefully consider the administrative remedies at issue to 
determine whether or not they are “available.”  Second, the court 
reasonably examines the actions of inmates to determine whether they 
have exhausted all their administrative remedies.  Finally, this Note 
will address the future landscape of prisoner civil rights litigation, both 




While the number of individuals currently incarcerated in 
American prisons has steadily risen, numbering now over 1.5 
                                                 
9 Jennifer Winslow, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury 
Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits:  Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1655, 1668 (2002). 
10 42 U.S.C. §§1997-1997j (1980). 
3
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million,11 the goal of correctional facilities has gradually shifted from 
rehabilitation to simple punishment.12  Within the states governed by 
the Seventh Circuit, over 91,000 men and women are incarcerated in 
either federal or state correctional facilities.13  Though prisons are not 
meant to be pleasant places, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged, "prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
inmates from the protections of the Constitution."14  There are certain 
rights that inmates must forfeit as a consequence of their incarceration, 
but they are understandably protective of the few civil rights that they 
retain while incarcerated.15  This defensive and protective attitude by 
prisoners is exacerbated by the imbalance of power between the 
individual inmate and their alleged aggressors, the state or federal 
government supervising the facility.16  The Supreme Court noted this 
difficulty in Preiser v. Rodriguez, stating that “[w]hat for a private 
citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with 
his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the 
prisoner, a dispute with the State.”17  Given the involuntary nature of 
their incarceration and the harsh conditions present in the penal 
system, it is not surprising that prisoners throughout the country often 
file lawsuits alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 
section 1983.18 
After the Supreme Court acknowledged that inmates could bring 
suit under section 1983, the number of lawsuits skyrocketed from 
                                                 
11 Allen J. Beck, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prisoners in 2004, at 3. (2005) available 
at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf. 
12 Adlerstein, supra note 8, at n.5. 
13 Beck, supra note 11, at 3. 
14 Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 84 (1987). 
15 Adlerstein, supra note 8, at 1682. 
16 Adlerstein, supra note 8, at 1683. 
17 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). 
18 Aside from section 1983, prisoners may bring: habeas corpus claims, Bivens 
actions, a Federal Tort Claims Act against the US, or an Administrative Procedures 
Act claim against a specific BOP guideline or procedure. 
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6,600 in 1975 to 68,000 in 1996.19  This flood of litigation threatened 
to overwhelm already crowded federal court dockets.20  These law 
suits addressed a broad range of interests, some of which were 
constitutionally recognizable and some which were not, including 
conditions of confinement, food, privacy, heat, mail, hair length, work 
details, segregation cells, religious practice and rehabilitation.21  As the 
number of inmate suits in federal court continued to rise, the increased 
presence of federal judicial review troubled many prison 
administrators, as well as state and local officials.22  Inmates were 
successful in achieving many meaningful reforms including greater 
access to legal materials23 and medical treatment.24, though there were 
certainly examples of frivolous lawsuits and inmates abusing the 
system.25  Eventually in 1980, the steadily increasing number of 
                                                 
19 See Jamie Ayers, To Plead or Not to Plead:  Does the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement Establish a Pleading Requirement or an 
Affirmative Defense?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 247, 248 (2005) (stating that the 
number of prisoner complaints rose from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 
1994); Danielle M. McGill, To Exhaust or Not to Exhaust?:  The Prisoner Litigation 
Reform Act Requires Prisoners to Exhaust All Administrative Remedies Before 
Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 129, 130 
(2003) (discussing that from 1980 to 1996, petitions filed by federal and state 
prisoners almost tripled, from 23,230 to 68,235). 
20 141 CONG. REC. S726 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (Remarks of Sen. Dole) 
(describing the detrimental effects of frivolous litigation on justice and court 
systems). 
21 Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners 
under Section 1997(e) of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935, 936 n. 4 (1986). 
22 Christopher E. Smith, The Governance of Corrections:  Implications of the 
Changing Interface of Courts and Corrections, 2 CRIM. JUST. 113, 126 (2000) 
(“States could no longer run prisons and jails according to their own values and for 
their own convenience.”). 
23 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (mandating that prison officials 
provide inmates with access to legal materials). 
24 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (obligating prison officials to 
provide prisoners with seriously needed medical care under the Eighth Amendment). 
25 Jeffrey R. Maahs & Rolando V. Del Carmen, Curtailing Frivolous Section 
1983 Inmate Litigation: Laws, Practices, and Proposals, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 
1995 at 53, 54 (estimating, “in one decade, [a single inmate] filed between 600 and 
5
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prisoner lawsuits and the resulting burden on crowded federal dockets, 
as well as congressional concerns about the constitutional rights of 
inmates, spurred federal legislative action.26 
 
A.  The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
 
In an effort to stem the tide of prisoner section 1983 litigation and 
strike a balance between deference to state officials and the rights of 
the institutionalized, Congress enacted the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) in 1980.27  Prior to 1980, 
inmates who wanted to sue in court were not required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies.28  CRIPA applied only to section 1983 
actions and contained the first exhaustion requirement for prisoner 
lawsuits.29  CRIPA did not require mandatory exhaustion, however, 
and gave judges the power to require plaintiffs to exhaust 
administrative remedies when "appropriate and in the interests of 
justice."30  A judge could continue a case for up to 180 days if he 
                                                                                                                   
700 suits in federal and state courts, the vast majority of which were repetitive, 
frivolous, and filed in forma pauperis.”). 
26 See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Enigmatic 
Exhaustion Requirement:  What It Means and What Congress, Courts and 
Correctional Officials Can Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 493 (2001). 
27 42 U.S.C. §§1997-1997j (1994 and Supp. III 1997).  The question of 
whether the number of lawsuits increased is an interesting one:  in 1980 there were 
12,397 increasing 227% to 40,569 in 1995.  But during the same time-span, the 
number of inmates increased 237%, thus the per capita rate of suits fell.  Adam 
Slutsky, Totally Exhausted:  Why a Strict Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997E(A) 
Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2289, 2294 (2005). 
28 See Winslow, supra note 9, at 1670.  (stating that in 1964, in Cooper v. Pate, 
the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 protects the fundamental 
rights of inmates.  378 U.S. 546 (1964).  After the Cooper decision, prisoners began 
to sue for civil rights violations at an astonishing rate). 
29 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 US.C. § 1997(e) (1996). 
30 42 US.C. § 1997(e)(a) (1996).  See also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 
140, 146 (1992)(holding that CRIPA's exhaustion requirement was not mandatory). 
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believed that the suit could be resolved using administrative 
remedies.31   
This discretionary exhaustion requirement offered prison officials 
the ability to resolve violations in administrative proceedings without 
involving the courts.32  The exhaustion provision of CRIPA further 
limited its own application by mandating that exhaustion could only be 
required where the administrative remedies had been certified by the 
Attorney General as meeting certain minimum standards.33  These 
standards required that inmates be afforded an advisory role in 
creating and applying a grievance procedure.34  The Supreme Court 
created a balancing test for determining when to require exhaustion 
under CRIPA, "federal courts must balance the interest of the 
individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum 
against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion."35 
Beyond the exhaustion requirement, CRIPA also gave the 
Attorney General of the United States authority to sue state and local 
officials responsible for facilities exhibiting a pattern or practice of 
flagrant or egregious violations of constitutional rights.36  CRIPA also 
set forth guidelines for prison administrative procedures and required 
that states have their procedure certified by the Attorney General in 
order to require exhaustion of remedies.37  Even with this discretionary 
exhaustion requirement, CRIPA allowed inmates to participate in the 
formation of the grievance procedures and many states refrained from 
having their procedures certified because of this requirement.38  The 
states’ refusal to adopt these provisions and alter their grievance 
procedures to accommodate inmates’ civil rights had the opposite of 
                                                 
31 42 US.C. (e)(a)(1) (1996). 
32 Branham, supra note 26, at 494-95. 
33 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (e)(a)(2). 
34 Minimum Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures, 28 C.F.R. § 40.2. 
35 McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (1996). 
37 42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a)(2) (1996). 
38 28 C.F.R. § 40.2  See also Lay, supra note 21 (discussing states’ rejection of 
the advisory role of inmates). 
7
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the intended effect and actually increased the number of prisoner suits 
filed and contributed to the burden on federal dockets as well as 
increased costs to prisons caused by defending suits.39  In response, 
many legal scholars, politicians and judges supported a change in the 
system that would reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits.40   
 
B.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
 
The civil rights of inmates were again the subject of 
Congressional legislation in 1996 with the passage of the aptly named 
amendment to CRIPA, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”).41  Though the legislative history is minimal, the PLRA was 
intended to stem the tide of purportedly frivolous prisoner lawsuits and 
reduce judicial oversight of correctional facilities.42  The PLRA 
represented a major change in prison litigation creating barriers such 
as requiring physical injury in tort claims, forcing even in forma 
pauperis prisoners to pay filing fees, and creating limits on attorney's 
fees.43  Most importantly, however, the PLRA drastically modified the 
CRIPA’s exhaustion of administrative remedies provision.44  Under the 
PLRA, inmates are required to exhaust all administrative remedies 
available, mandating, “No action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 
                                                 
39 See 142 CONG. REC. S10, 576 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Abraham) (States were spending $81 million annually fighting frivolous prisoner 
suits).  See also, Tracy M. Sullivan, Prisoners' Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil 
Rights Claims:  Must They Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under § 1997(e) 
Before Filing a Claim in Federal Court?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 419, 421 (2002) 
(As the prison population increased, lawsuits filed by prisoners nearly tripled 
between 1980 and 1996). 
40 See Slutsky, supra note 27, at 2295 (discussing the alliance of the National 
Association of Attorneys General and the National District Attorneys Association.) 
41  42 U.S.C. § 1997 (amended 1996). 
42 141 CONG. REC. S14413-14 (daily ed. September 27, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Dole, who sponsored and introduced the PLRA). 
43 See Winslow, supra note 28, at 1660 and Adlerstein, supra note 9, n. 29. 
44 See Branham, supra note 26, at 494-96. 
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Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”45   
The PLRA's exhaustion requirement was more restrictive and 
differed from CRIPA in five important ways:  First, the PLRA applies 
to all state, local and federal prisoners in contrast to CRIPA, which did 
not apply to federal prisoners or juveniles.46  Second, the exhaustion 
requirement was broadened to include pretrial detainees as well as 
convicted prisoners.47  Third, the PLRA requires dismissal of cases in 
which administrative remedies were not exhausted.48  Before the 
PLRA, courts continued or stayed cases until prisoners had exhausted 
administrative remedies.49  The PLRA lacks the discretionary 
application of the exhaustion requirement and removes the ability of 
judges to determine when requiring exhaustion is appropriate.  Finally, 
before a court could require a prisoner to use a prison's administrative 
grievance process, the process had to met certain requirements.50  The 
PLRA removed the requirements that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies must be "appropriate and in the interests of justice" or that 
the administrative remedies be "plain, speedy and effective."51  The 
PLRA also removed the five statutory standards for administrative 
remedies and required only that the remedies be "available."52 
                                                 
45 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (1996). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(h) (1996) (defining a "prisoner" subject to the 
exhaustion requirement as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is 
accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release or 
diversionary program."). 
47 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(h) (1996). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (1996). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a)(1) (1996). 
50 42 U.S,C. §1997(e)(a)-(b) (1996). 
51 42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a)-(b) (1996). 
52 42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a) (1996).  Interestingly, an earlier version of the PLRA 
approved by the House of Representatives retained the CRIPA requirements that 
administrative remedies be "plain, speedy, and effective" and that the Attorney 
General or court find that they meet certain delineated standards or are otherwise 
9
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The impact of the PLRA on prisoner lawsuits for constitutional 
violations was immediate and substantial.53  In the last year under 
CRIPA, inmates filed 41,679 civil rights petitions.54  In 2000, four 
years after the passage of the PLRA, the number of civil rights 
petitions dropped to 25,504, a reduction of 39%.55  Specifically, the 
more comprehensive and automatic exhaustion requirement greatly 
increased the number of inmate lawsuits that were dismissed for 
failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies.56  The 
Supreme Court, in interpreting the new exhaustion requirement under 
the PLRA, held that inmates were required to exhaust all available 
administrative remedies regardless of whether the claims involved 
general circumstances of incarceration or particular incidents, thus 
ensuring that the PLRA will govern all prisoner lawsuits in every 
state.57 
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND  
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
 
A. Background Seventh Circuit Jurisprudence 
 
There are two Seventh Circuit cases that help provide context for 
its more recent decisions.  The first is Massey v. Helman, in which the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed by strictly interpreting the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement and clarified the definition of “available” 
                                                                                                                   
"fair and effective."  H.R. J. RES. 667, 104th Cong. (1995).  These requirements were 
removed without explanation from the final version of the PLRA.. 
53 Slutsky, supra note 27, at 2302. 
54 John Scalia, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prisoner Petitions Filed in the U.S. 
District Courts, 2000, with Trends 1980-2000, at 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf. 
55 See Scalia, supra note 54. 
56 See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1627-28 
(2003). 
57 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002). 
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remedies.58  Massey claimed that because his lawsuit sought money 
damages and there were no administrative procedures in which he 
could collect monetary compensation, there were no administrative 
remedies “available” within the meaning of the PLRA.59  Relying on 
the earlier decision, the court clarified that the “effectiveness” of an 
administrative remedy is not the same as its “availability.”60  The court 
further stated that the inquiry was whether an administrative grievance 
procedure existed and not whether the inmate was satisfied with the 
results.61  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the district 
court, but acknowledged that if Massey’s hernia had healed before he 
filed his lawsuit, then he could have been exempted from the 
exhaustion requirement because money may have been the only 
remedy to his harm.62  Massey v. Helman also established that 
defendants must plead exhaustion of remedies as an affirmative 
defense under rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.63 
The second case is Pozo v. McCaughtry, in which the Seventh 
Circuit addressed whether an inmate’s failure to file a timely appeal 
would satisfy the exhaustion of remedies requirement of the PLRA.64  
First, the court pointed out that inmates must file complaints and 
appeals in the manner provided by the prison’s administrative rules.65  
But the court went further to say that if an inmate failed to file a 
                                                 
58 Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 729 (7th. Cir. 1999).  Massey had not 
sought any administrative relief before bringing his suit.  See also Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
(requiring prisons to provide inmates with seriously needed medical care to avoid 
constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment). 
59 Massey, 196 F.3d .at 733-34. 
60 Id. (citing Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th 
Cir. 1999). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 734. 
63 Id. at 735. 
64 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (2002). 
65 Id. at 1025. 
11
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grievance within the prescribed period of time, then he would be 
barred from bringing a suit regardless of the merits of his claim.66 
 
B. The Two Trends in Recent Seventh Circuit Exhaustion Analysis 
 
In 2005, the Seventh Circuit’s holdings have attempted to restore 
the balance between the civil rights of prisoners and autonomy for 
prison officials.  There are two related trends that appear in much of 
the courts recent jurisprudence that are helping to achieve this return 
to equilibrium.  First, the Seventh Circuit has carefully reviewed the 
administrative procedures at issue to determine whether they are 
“available” for purposes of the exhaustion requirement.  As the cases 
below reveal, this is not simply a rubber-stamp review and has led the 
court to find exhaustion in many cases where the correctional facility 
argued that there were indeed administrative remedies that were not 
exhausted before the suit was filed and the district court agreed by 
dismissing the suit.   
The second trend involves the court’s consideration given to 
inmate efforts to utilize internal prison procedures, even if these efforts 
are ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the disputed conduct or 
condition.  Again, the court has found exhaustion where an inmate has 
attempted to use grievance procedures or other “available” 
administrative remedies, even where prison officials have argued that 
those efforts were not sufficient.  These two related trends, as 
evidenced by the following cases, show how the Seventh Circuit has 
attempted to balance inmate rights against the competing objectives of 
administrative autonomy and avoiding crowded federal dockets. 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Evaluation of “Available”  
Administrative Remedies. 
 
In a recent case, Turner v. Huston, the Seventh Circuit carefully 
reviewed the actions of prisoner officials and determined that they had 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1024.  The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide this 
issue.  Woodford v. Ngo, 403 F.3d 620 (cert. granted Nov. 14, 2005). 
12
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made administrative remedies unavailable.67  Turner had filed his suit 
alleging six separate violations of his civil rights.68  First, the court 
reiterated that in order to meet the exhaustion requirement, an inmate 
must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the 
prison’s administrative rules require.”69  Next, in reviewing the 
administrative remedies at issue, the court considered that the Illinois 
Legislature had required that county jails permit inmates to submit 
complaints to the jail administration in written form and, if those 
complaints were not resolved at the local level, to submit a further 
complaint to the Jail and Detention Standards Unit of the IDOC.70 In 
order to seek review of the local decision, however, the prison rules 
required that a copy of the local decision must be attached to the 
complaint.71 
Turner alleged that he had submitted written grievances on four of 
his six claims, but never received any response from prison officials.72  
As a result, he was unable to submit any appeals because he never 
received any decision whatsoever and would not be able to attach it to 
his appeal as required.73  Further, the court noted the prison 
administrators never even explained the grievance procedures that 
Turner was supposed to have used to him and failed to respond to his 
grievances in any way.74  Accordingly, the court found that the 
                                                 
67 137 Fed. App’x 880, 882 (2005). 
68 He alleged that issues of a magazine were unreasonably withheld, the heat 
was not turned on before mid-November and inmates were denied blankets despite 
the freezing temperatures, he was subject to disciplinary segregation without 
adequate notice or an opportunity to rebut the charges, he was denied phone rights 
while in segregation, he was denied access to a copy machine, notary public, prompt 
mailing service or legal documents or an adequate law library, and he was denied an 
extra sheet even though a doctor had directed he be given one to treat a skin 
condition.  Id. at 881. 
69 Id. (citing Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
70 See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 701.160(c) (2005). 
71 See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 701.160(c)(2) (2005). 
72 Turner, 137 Fed. App’x at 881. 
73 Id. at 882. 
74 Id. 
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administrative remedies offered by the prison officials had been 
rendered unavailable to Turner.75  And where administrative remedies 
are unavailable, they are deemed exhausted for purposes of § 
1997(e)(a).76  The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of two of 
Turner’s claims, however, where he had never submitted grievances at 
the local level.77  Even though Turner argued that filing these 
grievances would probably not have accomplished anything, the court 
held that the apparent futility of filing a grievance is not an exception 
to the exhaustion requirement.78 
In Brengettcy v. Horton, the Seventh Circuit considered the case 
of an inmate at the Cook County Department of Corrections 
(“CCDOC”) who alleged violations of his constitutional rights under 
Section 1983 stemming from a physical altercation with a corrections 
officer.79  The defendants filed two motions to dismiss, one of which 
was based on Brengettcy’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies as required by the PLRA, section 1997(e)(a).80  Initially, 
Judge Bucklo, who presided over the case, dismissed both motions.81 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first examined the circumstances 
leading to the lawsuit, focusing on the confrontation with the 
correctional officers, to determine what remedies were indeed 
                                                 
75 Id.  See also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (preventing 
inmates from submitting grievances, or failing to respond to their grievances, renders 
administrative remedies unavailable). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Turner, 882-883, citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001); 
Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2002); and Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 
1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). 
79 423 F.3d 674, 677 (7th. Cir. 2005). 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  The case was transferred for administrative reasons to Judge St. Eve, 
who entered judgment in the defendants’ favor on the exhaustion argument after it 
was presented to her in a motion for summary judgment.  The Seventh Circuit held 
that there was not a compelling reason, as required, to overturn Judge Bucklo’s 
ruling regarding exhaustion.  Id. at 681. 
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available.82  Brengettcy’s complaint alleged that on August 21, 2000 
he was verbally abused by one of the defendants, Officer Horton, and 
then physically attacked.83  When Brengettcy fought back, 
reinforcements were called and he was repeatedly beaten and kicked 
by officers, even after he was handcuffed, and was then thrown down 
a flight of stairs where he was knocked unconscious.84  Brengettcy 
awoke the next morning in the hospital with pain throughout his body, 
sutures in his lip, and chipped front teeth.85  Two days later, on August 
23, 2000, he filed a written grievance with the CCDOC concerning the 
incident, which was within fifteen days as required by CCDOC’s 
grievance policy.86  He did not receive a reply within thirty days as the 
policy dictated and was not notified that his grievance would take 
longer to resolve.87  In October, Brengettcy asked Officer McCullen 
about the status of his grievance was told that sometimes the 
grievances are destroyed by corrections officers or other officials.88  
On November 27, 2000, he filed another grievance and again the 
CCDOC failed to respond within 30 days or give notice that it would 
take longer.89  Brengettcy brought suit under Section 1983 on March 
13, 2001, alleging that the officers’ conduct violated his civil rights.90 
In considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Bucklo 
reasoned that “[p]laintiff’s grievance was filed in 2000.  Defendants 
do not dispute that plaintiff never received a response... A plaintiff is 
not require[ed] to wait an unreasonable length of time-during which 
evidence, witnesses and memories may be lost - for a decision before 
he can go forward with his federal suit.”91 
                                                 
82 Id. at 677-78.   
83 Id. 
84 Id. 





90 Id. at 678-79. 
91 Id. at 678-79. 
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When considering the question of exhaustion, the court first 
reiterated the holding that exhaustion is “an affirmative defense that 
the defendants have the burden of pleading and proving.”92  Requiring 
that prisoners file grievances and appeals according to the prison’s 
administrative rules93, a prison official’s failure to respond to a 
prisoner’s claim can render administrative remedies unavailable.94  
This rule, also followed by the Fifth95 and Eighth96 Circuits, is based 
on a refusal to interpret the PLRA so narrowly as to permit prison 
officials to “exploit the exhaustion requirement through indefinite 
delay in responding to grievances.”97  In examining the facts, the court 
found that Brengettcy followed the CCDOC policy regarding filing 
grievances, but had not received any response as was required.  
Further, the court found that while the policy allowed a prisoner to 
appeal a decision within five days of its receipt, there was no policy 
regarding what prisoner should do when the CCDOC fails to respond 
and there is no decision for them to appeal.98  Accordingly, the court 
reversed the entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the 
alleged failure to exhaust because Brengettcy alleged that he filed a 
grievance within the time period mandated by CCDOC rules and the 
defendants had failed to meet their burden of proof.99 
 
 In Westefer v. Snyder, the Seventh Circuit considered the claims of 
several prisoners, all members of various prison gangs, that they had 
been transferred to Tamms Correction Center (“Tamms”) as retaliation 
                                                 
92 Id. at 682 (citing Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
93 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). 
94 Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2002). 
95 Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999); Underwood v. Wilson, 
151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998). 
96 Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Norris, 247 
F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001). 




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
62 
for exercising their First Amendment rights.100  Tamms is the highest 
security prison in Illinois and was designed to be harsh, so that the 
threat of transfer to Tamms would deter prisoners throughout the 
IDOC from disobeying prison rules.101  The district court had 
dismissed the suits of several of the prisoners for failure to exhaust 
their administrative remedies.102  As usual, the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis began by examining the administrative procedures by which 
the inmates could have challenged their transfers to Tamms.103 
As an initial matter, the court requested that the parties file 
supplemental briefs discussing the administrative procedures available 
to a Tamms prisoner because the record and initial briefs did not 
present a “clear picture.”104  The IDOC has two avenues by which 
inmates must challenge their transfer to Tamms: through the transfer 
review hearing process and the inmate grievance process.105  
Additionally, Illinois regulations establish two types of transfer 
hearings at Tamms, depending on the inmate’s segregation category 
upon arrival at the facility.106  Prisoners are classified as subject to 
either administrative or disciplinary segregation, and different review 
processes govern each category.107   
Inmates in administrative detention are given a transfer review 
hearing within ten working days of their arrival at Tamms “whenever 
possible.”108  At this hearing inmates can make statements challenging 
their placement, submit documentary evidence and request that the 
transfer committee interview witnesses.109  This transfer committee 
                                                 
100 422 F.3d 570, 572-573 (7th Cir. 2005). 
101 Id. at 572. 
102 Id. at 576. 
103 Id. at 577. 
104 Id. at 577. 
105 Id. at 578.  Transfer review hearing at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 505.60(a) 
(2005) and the grievance procedure at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.810(a) (2005). 
106 Id. at 578. 
107 Id. at 578. 
108 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 505.60(a) (2005). 
109 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 505.60(b) (2005). 
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makes a recommendation to the warden, who approves or denies the 
recommendation before forwarding it to the Deputy Director.110  In 
contrast, inmates who are transferred to Tamms in disciplinary 
segregation are not afforded an initial transfer review hearing.111  In 
fact, prisoners in disciplinary segregation only receive a hearing when 
their term of disciplinary segregation ends.112  The court was 
concerned by this provision’s possible application, where a prisoner 
who was transferred while serving a long disciplinary sentence would 
not be able to contest their transfer until the end of that long 
sentence.113  After the initial transfer review hearing, inmates are 
reviewed every ninety days to determine whether placement at Tamms 
is still appropriate.114  Again, however, inmates in disciplinary 
segregation are not given this quarterly review.115  Finally, individuals 
in administrative segregation are given an annual review while those 
in disciplinary segregation are not.116   
The court found that this transfer review process was not an 
adequate administrative remedy for two reasons.117  First, prisoners 
who were transferred in, and remained in, disciplinary segregation had 
not yet qualified for a review hearing.118  Accordingly, this remedy 
was not “available” to them and did not have to be exhausted.119  
Second, prisoners are not informed of the reasons for their transfer to 
Tamms and cannot contest these reasons at their review hearings.120  If 
a prisoner does find out the reasons for his transfer after completing 
the initial transfer review, they must wait at least one more year before 
                                                 
110 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 505.60(b) and (d) (2005). 
111 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 505.60(a) (2005). 
112 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §505.60(a) (2005). 
113 Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 578 (7th Cir. 2005). 
114 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §505.70(a) (2005). 
115 Westefer, 422 F.3d at 578 (citing 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §505.70(a) (2005)). 
116 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §505.70(b) (2005).  
117 Westefer, 422 F.3d at 579-80. 
118 Id. at 579, (relying on ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §505.60(a) (2005)). 
119 Id. (citing Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
120 Id. 
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they can present evidence at an annual review hearing.121  Relying on 
these issues, the Seventh Circuit found that the IDOC had not shown 
that the prisoners had failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies.122 
In examining the second administrative remedy by which an 
inmate could appeal their transfer to Tamms, the grievance process, 
the Seventh Circuit found confusion within the IDOC guidelines.123  
In Illinois, “incidents, problems, and complaints” can be addressed 
through grievances.124  The grievance process cannot, however, be 
used for complaints “regarding decisions that are outside the authority 
of the Department, such as parole decisions, clemency, or order 
regarding length of sentence or decisions that have been rendered by 
the Director.”125  The court interpreted the phrase “or decisions that 
have been rendered by the Director” to possibly apply to the 
administrative decision to transfer an inmate to Tamms.126  The court 
also found that the IDOC’s ultimate grievance appeal body, the 
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), had been inconsistent in 
categorizing inmate grievances requesting transfers as properly before 
them on appeal or an administrative prerogative of IDOC.127  The 
court also considered the fact that a Tamms counselor and other IDOC 
officials had given contradictory advice to inmates about the proper 
venue for their transfer appeals.128 




124 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §504.810(a) (2005). 
125 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §504.810(a) (2005). 
126 Westefer, 422 F.3d at 579. 
127 Id. at 579-580. (The ARB had addressed one prisoner’s grievance 
complaining of his transfer, but had refused to address another prisoner’s grievance 
for transfer saying it was administrative prerogative of IDOC). 
128 Id. at 580 (A Tamms counselor said he could not use grievance system, 
other prison officials said this was the only way to contest transfer.) 
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Finally, the court examined the variety of Tamms-specific 
regulations in the Illinois Administrative Code129 for a provision 
addressing how a prison could challenge his transfer to Tamms.130  
Finding none, the court concluded that if there were a regulation that 
specified the proper means for this challenge, then prisoners would be 
required to fulfill its administrative requirements.131  In struggling to 
determine whether an administrative remedy existed at all, the court 
predicted, “[i]f the ARB took consistent positions on its authority to 
address a transfer grievance, a clear route for the prisoner at least 
would be evident and we could proceed to determine its 
effectiveness.”132  But absent any such consistency or other remedy, 
the court concluded that the grievance process was not an “available” 
administrative remedy for the prisoners who wished to appeal their 
transfers.133 
 
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Evaluation of “Exhaustion” 
 
In December 1994, Donald Greeno began complaining of severe 
heartburn while incarcerated at Racine Correctional Institution.134  
Over the next three years, Greeno was repeatedly denied necessary 
medical treatment and eventually suffered severe and permanent 
digestive damage.135 
In June 2000, Greeno filed suit under Section 1983, alleging that 
his doctors and other Wisconsin Department of Correction’s 
employees had shown deliberate indifference to his serious medical 
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.136  Greeno also alleged 
deliberate indifference by the employees who had processed his 
                                                 
129 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §505(2005). 




134 Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2005). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 651. 
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inmate complaints relating to his medical care.137  On appeal, the 
defendants argued that Greeno had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies as required because he “did not appeal every single 
complaint that he filed through the highest level of review, the 
Department of Corrections Secretary.”138  The Seventh Circuit rejected 
this argument and found that there was no requirement that every 
inmate complaint be appealed through the highest level.139  The court 
also found that Greeno had exhausted his administrative remedies as 
required by § 1997(e)(a) where he had filed every grievance according 
to the prison’s policies, detailed exactly what his injuries and needs 
were, and appealed at least seven of his complaints to the Department 
of Corrections Secretary, “Greeno fully exhausted his prison remedies 
with respect to complaints that alerted prison officials to the nature of 
his problem and gave them an opportunity to resolve it.”140  “In short, 
Greeno took all steps prescribed by the prison grievance system, thus 
satisfying the exhaustion requirement.”141  The Seventh Circuit 
concluded by vacating the district court’s judgment and allowing 
Greeno’s claims against most of the prison employees to continue.142 
 
Rodger Thornton is an inmate serving out a life sentence in the 
IDOC, currently at the Pontiac Correctional Center.143  After a 
disciplinary charge, Thornton was placed in a segregation cell on 
January 13, 2000.144  Thornton was very upset by the conditions in his 
cell and wrote letters to the Director of the Pontiac Correctional 
Center, the Warden, and other officials.145  Thornton received no 
response to these requests and submitted an emergency grievance to 
                                                 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 652. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (citing McCoy v. Gilbert, 270 F.3d 503, 512 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
141 Id.  See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004). 
142 Id. at 658, 659. 
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the warden asking to be moved on January 28, 2000, two weeks after 
his placement in the segregation cell.146  Thornton subsequently 
received a letter stating that his grievance did not constitute an 
emergency.147 
On February 22, 2000, after being transferred to another 
segregation cell, Thornton filed a grievance requesting a clean 
mattress in his new cell.148  After receiving another unsatisfactory 
mattress, Thornton was given a satisfactory one on May 11.  The next 
day, prison officials dismissed the February 22 grievance as moot 
since Thornton had received an acceptable mattress.149 
Thornton eventually brought suit against several prison officials 
pursuant to Section 1983 for alleged violations of his Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.150  
He sought monetary damages for the time he was confined in the 
initial segregation cell as well as the time he was in the second 
segregation cell without a mattress.151The district court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on Thornton’s cell condition 
claims on the basis that he had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.152 
                                                 
146 Id.  As written, the grievance stated in part:   
This seg cell north 106 is in very poor shape.  There appears to be 
human feces smeared on the walls covering most of the inside of 
the cell.  It has a foul smell to it.  The toilet leaks.  There is 2 to 3 
inches of water on the floor, it clearly has a sewer aroma to it.  The 
water that comes from the sink is discolored it looks like rust 
water.  The conditions of this mattress sir is so bad that there is no 
way I can or will sleep on it.  Its stained and its got a piss smell to 
it...I can’t even eat cuz of the smell in this cell.  I’ve already had 
several asthma attacks since I’ve been back here.  Sir please help 
this is just not right at all...Please I beg of you before I contract 
some major health problems get me out of here. 
147 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit first examined the grievance process 
followed by the IDOC, codified in the Illinois Administrative Code.153  
Under that procedure, an inmate can submit a written grievance to a 
designated grievance officer, who then submits his recommendation to 
the institution warden.154  In response, the warden “shall advise the 
offender of the decision in writing within two months after receipt of 
the written grievance, where reasonably feasible.155  Alternatively, an 
inmate can request that a grievance be handled on an emergency basis 
by submitting the grievance directly to the warden.156  If the warden 
determines that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury 
or other serious or irreparable harm, the grievance is to be handled on 
an emergency basis.157  The process also provides:  “[i]f, after 
receiving the response of the [warden], the offender still feels that the 
problem, complaint, or grievance has not been resolved to his or her 
satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing to the Director within 30 
days after the date of the decision.”158  With this policy in hand, the 
Seventh Circuit turned to the defendants’ argument that Thornton had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.159 
The defendants’ initial exhaustion argument was that Thornton did 
not even properly begin the grievance process regarding the conditions 
in his first segregation cell.160  Under this argument, the defendants’ 
claimed that after the warden found that the grievance was not an 
emergency, the grievance ceased to exist.161  The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed, however, because Thornton had followed the procedures for 
filing an emergency grievance when he submitted his grievance 
                                                 
153 Id. at 694 (citing ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.800 et seq. (2005)) 
154 Id. (citing ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §§ 504.810; 504.830 (2005)). 
155 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.830(d) (2005). 
156 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.840 (2005). 
157 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.840 (2005). 
158 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.850(2005). 
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directly to the warden.162  When the warden only informed Thornton 
that his grievance was not an emergency and did not discuss the merits 
of the grievance, “There is nothing in the current regulatory text, 
however, that requires an inmate to file a new grievance after learning 
that it will not be considered on an emergency basis.”163  Additionally, 
the fact that Thornton was transferred, and thus received exactly the 
relief he had requested, before the thirty-day time for him to appeal the 
warden’s decision had expired led the court to reject this initial 
argument.164 
In response to the defendants’ larger exhaustion argument, 
Thornton argued that he had properly filed his grievances and received 
exactly the relief he asked for and thus fulfilled his duty to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.165  As to his initial grievance filed on January 
28, Thornton had asked to be transferred and was indeed transferred to 
another cell by February 22.166  In his second grievance, Thornton 
requested a replacement mattress and subsequently received one.167  
After he was given the new mattress, the grievance officer and warden 
found that the grievance was now moot and dismissed it as such.168  
The defendants contended that Thornton should have appealed both of 
these grievances to the Director of the Department of Corrections as 
allowed in the grievance procedures.169  The court disagreed with the 
defendants’ interpretation of the PLRA exhaustion requirement, 
however, and found that Thornton did not have to “appeal grievances 
that were resolved as he requested and where money damages were 
not available.”170 
                                                 
162 Id. (citing ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.840 (2005)). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 694-695. 
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In rejecting the defendants’ interpretation that the PLRA required 
inmates to appeal grievance resolved favorably to the highest level 
possible, the court looked to its previous interpretations as well as the 
analysis of the Second and Tenth Circuits on this issue.171  First, the 
court found that if an injury has been healed by the time a lawsuit 
begins, nothing other than damages could be a “remedy,” and if the 
administrative process cannot provide compensation then there is no 
administrative remedy to exhaust.172  This conclusion was buttressed 
by the Tenth and Second Circuits’ interpretation that prisoners are not 
required to appeal favorable decisions.173  Even where the defendants 
relied on the statement in Booth v. Churner that futility is not an 
excuse for failure to exhaust available remedies, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the circumstances of the case made Booth inapplicable.174  
While there was a possibility of some relief in Booth, Thornton had 
already received what he requested in his grievances and there was 
nothing else that prison officials could give him, “Without the 
possibility of some relief, the administrative officers would 
presumably have no authority to act on the subject of the complaint, 
leaving the inmate with nothing to exhaust.”175 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed several policy arguments 
advanced by the defendants, chief among them the contention that the 
grievance system is designed to provide notice to prison officials of 
systemic problems and inmates should be required to pursue further 
administrative review to ensure such notice is given.176  The court 
disagreed and countered that Thornton had properly submitted his 
grievances and prison officials were aware of his complaints and it is 
not “Thornton’s responsibility to notify persons higher in the chain 
when this notification would be solely for the benefit of the prison 
                                                 
171 Id. at 695-696. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (citing Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 
2001) and Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 653 (2nd Cir. 2004)). 
174 Id. (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001)). 
175 Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 746 n.6 (2001)). 
176 Id. at 696-97. 
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administration.”177  Further, requiring inmates to appeal favorable 
decisions would risk reversal of these decisions and thus increase, not 
decrease, the number of inmate suits, in contrast to the very purpose of 
the PLRA.178  Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s entry 
of summary judgment against Thornton and found that he had 
exhausted his administrative remedies as required.179 
 
TRENDS AND OVERALL ANALYSIS 
 
Though each case is fact-specific, the cases discussed above 
illustrate the two prevailing trends in the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of inmate claims under Section 1983.  These two related 
trends recognize that an efficient exhaustion requirement creates a 
burden on both prison officials and prison inmates.  In determining 
whether any administrative remedies are “available,” the deference 
given to prison officials traditionally by the courts with regard to the 
operation of prisons and their administration will not prevent the court 
from closely examining alleged constitutional violations and the 
administrative remedies available to aggrieved inmates.  By requiring 
that prison officials offer effective and comprehensive administrative 
remedies, the Seventh Circuit actually reinforces the primary goal of 
the PLRA, a reduction in the number of lawsuits and an increase in the 
quality of lawsuits that actually get onto federal dockets.  Through 
these decisions, the court has been able to critique several 
administrative procedural requirements and tip the balance in favor of 
civil rights where these remedies are unavailable. 
The second group of cases focuses less on the adequacy of the 
specific administrative remedy and more on the conduct of the 
prisoner who has filed suit.  As long as prisoner follow the 
administrative procedures as they are described, they will satisfy the 
exhaustion of remedies requirement of the PLRA.  Further, prisoners 
are not forced to appeal favorable decisions in order to preserve their 
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ability to bring suit to vindicate their rights.  Additionally, the court 
will find that administrative remedies have been exhausted where the 
inmate has filed their grievances in a timely manner, even if the prison 
officials have not responded as required.   
Even though inmates are required to exhaust administrative 
procedures, the Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the exhaustion 
requirement under the PLRA as an affirmative defense places the 
burden on prison officials to show what an inmate should have done 
and why they should have done it.  Though this burden may be heavy, 
it is justified for several reasons.  First, prison officials are in a much 
betterposition than inmates to understand the often-confusing 
administrative regulations and procedures necessary for resolving 
complaints and would ,therefore ,be better able to explain an inmate’s 
failure to the court.  Second, studies show that a large percentage of 
inmate suits are brought pro se and to require the average inmate to 
adequately understand the administrative procedures and further show 
how they were or were not “available” would lead to the dismissal of 
many legitimate Section 1983 claims and, thereby, damage to the civil 
rights of prisoners everywhere.  This is beyond the simple fact that 
seven out of ten prisoners have only the lowest level of reading and 
writing ability.180 
In the cases discussed above, the Seventh Circuit correctly shifted 
the burden of proof onto prison officials, rather than placing it on 
uneducated and abused prisoners.  This helped insure that prisons were 
indeed responding to inmate grievances or appeals for change, or that 
at least the inmates were given a voice with which to protect their 
constitutional rights.  While this goes against the interpretations of 
many of the district courts throughout the Seventh Circuit, it serves the 
purpose of the PLRA where it requires that prisons adopt reasonable 
and effective administrative procedures so that inmates do not need to 
bring suit in federal court in order to have their rights protected.  
While there may be inmates that will file frivolous lawsuits even 
where there are administrative remedies available, the recent cases 
                                                 
180 Karl O. Haigler et al., Literacy Behind Prison Walls 17-19 (1994), 
available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs94/94102.pdf. 
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decided by the Seventh Circuit show that many inmates present valid 
claims that could have been remedied had the grievance or other 




The increasing number of inmates in American prisons and 
subsequent overcrowding are likely to lead to an increasing number of 
lawsuits filed by prisoners.  In the face of this tide, the pressure on 
federal courts to manage their dockets will only continue to grow.  
Under the PLRA, every inmate lawsuit that enters federal court will 
force the court to weigh the rights of prisoners against the 
administrative remedies available to them.  In the Seventh Circuit, the 
court should continue to place the burden on prison officials to show 
that there were indeed administrative remedies that should have been 
exhausted.  Further, the court should continue to closely scrutinize the 
“availability” of administrative remedies to ensure that grievance 
procedures are effective.  Finally, given the fact that many prisoners 
will not be able to retain lawyer to litigate their section 1983 or other 
civil rights claims, the court must look at the conduct of the inmate in 
the context of the particular administrative remedies available to 
determine whether they have exhausted all available administrative 
remedies.  Only in this way can the court insure that they do not 
sacrifice justice for the sake of judicial economy and protect the 
fundamental civil rights of prisoners. 
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